Professor Phillipa Week's contribution to employment law
It is a very great honour for me to be invited to give the Phillipa Weeks Lecture in Labour Law this year. Unfortunately, I never had the pleasure of meeting Phillipa in person, but she was a most generous labour law colleague when Rosemary Owens and I were preparing our first edition of The Law of Work. Even during her illness, Phillipa read and commented on my early drafts of chapters on the contract of employment. Phillipa was especially well known for her work on trade union law, and on public sector employment, but she was also esteemed as an excellent scholar in general employment contract law. So I thought that it would be fitting to celebrate her scholarship this evening by looking at a particularly important contribution she made to our understanding of the relationship between statute and common law in the development of contemporary employment law.
Incoherence in the law
The problem of coherence -or more correctly, potential incoherence -between common law developments and statutory innovation has become a particular concern in employment law.
Phillipa was one of the first employment law scholars to pick up this theme in the chapter she contributed to a book published out of the ANU College of Law at the Australian National 
Phillipa Week's thesis
The essential thesis in Phillipa's chapter was that employment law -in both the UK and Australia -has suffered incoherence as a consequence of the interplay between the common law and statutory developments. She boldly lay the blame for that incoherence squarely at the feet of judges, who, she complained, had abdicated their responsibility for ensuring a coherent development of common law principle out of excessive deference for an imagined obstacle created by statutory schemes.
Phillipa's chapter explains that it was the common law's own weaknesses -particularly in the remedies available to working people -that prompted the introduction of statutory schemes permitting employees to seek compensation for unfair dismissal. 4 A claim for a pay-out of a short notice period was rarely worth taking to the common law courts, so Parliaments enacted statutory schemes to improve compensation to unfairly dismissed workers. Subsequently, judges developed the implied term of 'trust and confidence' to ensure that employers could not avoid their statutory liabilities by bullying workers into resignation. There was a risk that employers would use this tactic because only employees who had been dismissed could use the legislation. It was not available to those who resigned.
In the Malik 5 decision, which was so influential in securing broad acceptance of this new implied term in English law, the House of Lords recognised the potential for incoherent common law development in the application of this implied term. In that case, they were considering the viability of a claim for damages based on the plaintiffs' loss of employability as a consequence of being stigmatised by their association with a corrupt employer. They successfully navigated a concern with coherence between the remedies available for breach of contract, and those available in tort for defamation, by emphasising that these two bodies of law -contract and defamation -provided for two different kinds of loss or harm. Contractual damages compensate for any financial loss flowing from breach of a contractual promise, and in this case, the loss of income-earning capacity as a consequence of a breach of the employment contract was held to be amenable to a damages claim. 6 Damages awarded in a defamation case, however, are intended to compensate for injury to the plaintiff's reputation and sense of outrage. It is not necessary to prove any financial loss as a consequence of reputational harm in order to be awarded damages in defamation. So the court was able to articulate a distinction between two branches of the common law, to preserve coherence in the development of the common law itself.
A few short years after the Malik decision, however, came another highly influential case which disturbed the development of the implied obligation of trust and confidence. The case was
Johnson v Unisys Ltd, 7 and it concerned a man who had already received statutory compensation for unfair dismissal, but was now seeking additional compensation under the common law for more extensive damages flowing from breach of his employment contract. As Phillipa explained, Mr Johnson 'contended that the manner of his dismissal had caused his nervous breakdown and consequent loss of employment prospects'. 8 The majority denied his claim out of a concern with coherence between common law development and statute. The majority were concerned that allowing Mr Johnson access to damages for breach of contract when he had already received the maximum compensation allowable under a statutory scheme would be a 'recipe for chaos '. 9 Lord Hoffmann explained that '[e]mployment law requires a balancing of the interests of employers and employees', and 'the point at which that balance is struck is a matter for democratic decision'. 10 In other words, judges must take their lead from Parliament. Common law development must be consistent with legislative policy, and should not undermine the 'evident intention of Parliament'.
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The consequence of this decision for the development of the implied term of trust and confidence was the articulation of a clear limit on its application: the employer's obligation not to act in a manner calculated to destroy mutual trust and confidence could not be extended to constrain any decision to terminate the employment contract, nor could it lead to any compensation for damages arising as a consequence of the termination of employment itself. should not be disturbed because judges were afraid to develop the common law in a field now also inhabited by statute. And so she urged the courts 'to take the lead in restoring coherence to the common law'.
15
There is much force in Phillipa's argument. For a start, her view that the common law and statutory rights and responsibilities coexist without necessarily intermingling is supported by the High Court decision in Byrne v Australian Airlines, 16 which held that a binding industrial award did not necessarily become part of an employee's common law contract of employment.
The two systems of law -common law contract, and industrial arbitration leading to compulsory awards -were based on different principles, and so produced different remedies.
Contract law is predicated on the assumption that parties should be bound to observe their own voluntarily made commitments. If they breach those commitments, they are bound to put their counterparty into as good a position as they would have enjoyed if the promises had been fulfilled. The system of arbitrated awards, however, was based on the entirely different principle that employers in an industry should be compelled (regardless of any agreement) to respect the minimum conditions of employment determined as a consequence of a tribunal's decision made in the public interest, to resolve an industrial dispute. The remedies flowing from breach of an award are those stipulated in the statutory scheme creating that compulsion.
Phillipa's argument -and it is one with which I agree -is that the statutory unfair dismissal regime in Australia is a separate and different body of law from the common law of employment contracts. In Australia, as we well know, unfair dismissal applications are dealt with in a completely different jurisdiction from common law claims. They are arbitrated by a tribunal exercising administrative power. While the rights and responsibilities under the employment contract may be relevant in determining whether a dismissal was 'unfair', there is no necessity to demonstrate breach of the employment contract to seek a remedy. The principal remedy for a successful applicant is reinstatement (which is a remedy generally unavailable at common law), and the underpinning policy of the legislation is to promote job 15 Weeks above n 1 at p 196. 16 (1995) 185 CLR 410. security across the labour market. It is a law concerned with the broad public interest in providing a measure of job security for ordinary workers, notwithstanding that their employment contracts do not guarantee them that security.
On this view, the legislative unfair dismissal scheme in Australia 
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Notwithstanding the great force of Phillipa's arguments, I seriously doubt that her recommendations will bear much fruit in the foreseeable future. A number of developments in both common law and statute in the years since Phillipa published her thesis would suggest that her proposals have unfortunately proven to be rather too optimistic.
And so I will move to the second part of this paper: developments in employment law that have influenced the relationship between common law and statute, and perhaps added to concerns about the internal coherence of the common law.
17 [2006] FCA 784.
Recent developments
I will note three particular developments that I believe have changed the landscape since Phillipa was writing.
The obvious change is the increasingly prescriptive provisions in the statutory scheme which
give more credence to a view that Parliament intends to 'cover the field' of remedies for a harsh dismissal. At the time Phillipa was writing, the Burazin decision 18 was the most important Australian decision on this issue. In that case the Industrial Relations Court of Australia (which was subsequently folded into the Federal Court) awarded a measure of damages for hurt and humiliation because of the despicable manner in which the dismissed employee was marched off the premises. The court emphasised that this head of damage was awarded as an element of the statutory compensation available to Ms Burazin, and would not be available under common law, for so long as the Addis 19 principle remained good law. That is, the principle that there is no compensation in contract for hurt and humiliation alone. Since the introduction of the Work Choices amendments to unfair dismissal provisions in 2006, the statutory scheme has specifically prohibited awarding any compensation in respect of 'hurt and humiliation '. 20 This statutory development is likely to fuel arguments that Parliament has now spoken the last word on whether hurt, humiliation or distress can sound in a compensatory award following dismissal from employment. It would be difficult now to mount an argument in a common law termination case that the common law should overturn more than a century of its own jurisprudence to develop a remedy that a recently enacted statute clearly forbids.
This is not to say that there is not still room for common law damages for a range of other consequences arising out of the manner in which a person is dismissed. We have seen 18 Burazin v Blacktown City Guardian Pty Ltd (1996) that certain express provisions in an employment contract should not have the effect one would normally expect a contract term to have. These proceedings involved two similar matters, both concerning employees who had been dismissed after badly managed disciplinary processes. Edwards concerned the sacking of a doctor, and Botham involved a social worker.
Each of these employees had been engaged under written employment contracts which contained express clauses entitling them to certain procedures before they could be dismissed on disciplinary grounds. In both cases, the employers failed to follow their own procedures. 
Hurley.
26 But in Edwards, Lords Dyson, Walker and Mance held that the employers' breaches of these promised procedures ought not to sound in common law damages, because the employers must be assumed to have included these terms in their employment contract documentation only to demonstrate an intention to comply with statutory obligations to afford employees procedural fairness. Working from the assumption that contract law gives effect to the intentions of the parties, these judges held that the employers intended to be bound only by statutory obligations, and must not be presumed to have intended to be subject to ordinary common law sanctions should they breach these terms in their employment contracts. A complainant would still be confined to statutory compensation for breach, because any claim concerning disciplinary procedures was necessarily a complaint about the manner of dismissal,
and Parliament had enacted a statute to deal with such complaints.
I must say that when I first read this decision I found this to be an ingenious argument. On this reasoning, it seemed that an employee could never win. Even if the employee insisted on negotiating an express term in the employment contract, guaranteeing procedural fairness before dismissal, it could be defeated by this interpretation of the assumed intentions of the parties. The court anticipated this objection by stating that these kinds of express contractual terms could be given full contractual force under the common law, if the parties 'expressly agree' 27 that breach would give rise to contract-based damages. Only a lawyer could be trusted to make, or to understand, such a distinction, and to ensure that the right 'magic words' were drafted into the contract.
It remains to be seen whether these particular findings from Edwards will be adopted in any pay, when Citigroup reneged on its contract to engage him in a senior management position.
Access to these kinds of damages depends on proof of a contractual entitlement to remain in employment for a considerable period of time.
If an employee can demonstrate that, but for the breach of a contract term promising fair procedures before dismissal, the employer would have engaged the employee for a long period of time, then an Australian employee can legitimately claim damages for the loss of an opportunity or chance to remain in employment.
Other Australian cases have also accepted the legitimacy of a 'loss of chance' claim in an employment context.
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So -my second concern is that the common law judges have taken deference to statutory schemes even further, by assuming that employers are focused on statutory compliance alone when they make their contracts. Perhaps the statutory schemes have become so influential, that their effect in modifying organisational behaviour does warrant this kind of judicial notice.
The final development in Australia which makes me less than optimistic about Phillipa's thesis is the present state of our jurisprudence on mutual trust and confidence. 33 Here I would like to make some brief remarks about the recent full court decision in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker. 34 Although the facts of the Barker decision were particularly convoluted at first instance, the essential issue that emerged in the case was whether the bank had breached its employment contract with a senior manager when it failed to comply with its own redeployment procedures before terminating his employment for reasons of redundancy. The specifics of the redeployment procedures were contained in a policy manual which the bank claimed was not part of its employment contracts. The reason the procedures were not followed properly in Mr
Barker's case was that he was deprived of all means of effective communication from the bank's HR people when his mobile phone was confiscated and his email access was cut off. The bank's own conduct made it practically impossible for the bank to communicate effectively any potential new positions that he might take up rather than accept redundancy.
At first instance, 35 Besanko J held that the policy document was not incorporated into Mr
Barker's employment contract, however the bank's conduct in making it impossible for Mr Barker to enjoy the potential benefit of redeployment was a breach of its implied obligation not to destroy mutual trust and confidence. This breach of contract occurred while he was still employed, so it could sound in damages for breach, without offending the 'Johnson exclusion zone'. Damages were assessed on the basis that Mr Barker had lost a valuable opportunity for redeployment, and he was awarded compensation of $317,500.
At the time this decision was published there was a furore among employer lawyers, because the case seemed to defeat their best drafting strategies, employed since the Nikolich decision, to specifically exclude employer policy documents from having any contractual force. When I first read the decision myself, I didn't find it particularly exciting. It seemed to do little more than provide another example of the way in which the implied term (of mutual trust and confidence) may work, and it was certainly consistent with the decision of Allsop J in Nevertheless, the bank appealed the decision.
The full bench decision is an interesting one for those of us concerned with the potential development of the common law of employment contracts. The majority (Jacobson and Lander JJ) decided the case as a matter of contract construction. They held that the Redeployment Policy was not a term of the employment contract, so breach of the policy itself could not constitute a breach of contract. Nevertheless, they held that Australian law does recognise the implied duty not to destroy mutual trust and confidence, and that this duty had its origins in a general duty of cooperation. The implied term operated so as to ensure that the parties to the contract cooperated in allowing each to enjoy the intended benefits of the contract. In this case, the intended benefit was apparent in a clause written into the contract itself, which included the following sentence:
In the case where the position occupied by the Employee becomes redundant and the Bank is unable to place the Employee in an alternative position with the Bank or one of its related bodies, in keeping with the Employee's skills and experience, the compensation payment will be calculated . . .etc.
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The majority held that this clause 'contemplated the possibility of redundancy and redeployment within the Bank as an alternative to termination'. 38 The bank had failed in its duty to cooperate when it acted in a manner that prevented Mr Barker from accessing the 36 (2002) While the majority recognised the implied duty of mutual trust and confidence, and was prepared to employ it to find that the bank was liable for damages for breaching its employment contract, the court did not make any decision that would challenge the Addis principle. Nothing in Barker would provide any confidence that the courts will be prepared to take the step urged in Phillipa's thesis, that the implied term of trust and confidence should be extended to the manner of termination of employment.
We also cannot ignore Jessup J's vigorous dissent in this case. Justice Jessup methodically demolishes the foundation for the implied term, by asserting that the English authority upon which it has been developed is questionable, that the term lacks the required 'necessity' to justify its acceptance according to the precepts of Australian contract law, and ultimately he objects that acceptance of the implied term would 'overlap a number of legislated prohibitions and requirements in particular dimensions of the employment relationship' and so tend to 'compromise the democratically-drawn architecture of the relevant obligations'. 41 In other words, a term implied as a matter of common law principle would be incoherent with contemporary statutory regimes, and statutory regimes should prevail.
So from the Barker decision we have two views on the relationship between common law and statute: the majority decision permitting a principled but very limited development in the common law, founded on older common law authority; the dissenting minority preferring to 39 At [138] . 40 (1991) cut off further common law development in deference to an increasingly extensive statutory reach into the regulation of employment.
And so I come to the third and final part of this paper: if Phillipa's thesis has fallen on deaf
Australian ears -what alternative visions are there, to promote coherence in Australian employment law?
The case for a new statutory obligation?
I think the answer is probably buried in Phillipa's thesis itself. She says, 'relief may come from the legislature', but she expresses pessimism about how realistic a legislative solution may be, especially, she says, 'in Australia where there are multiple jurisdictions'. 42 Since that time, however, we have made considerable headway towards creating a single national jurisdiction for private sector employment law (notwithstanding some Western Australian exceptionalism).
Since that time, the Fair Work legislation has created more extensive protections for workplace rights in the 'adverse action' provisions, and these have been engaged on behalf of workers who would not be eligible to bring unfair dismissal proceedings. More recently, we have seen amendments to the legislation conferring a limited jurisdiction on the Fair Work Commission to attempt to resolve complaints about workplace bullying.
It may well be that the newly elected federal government does not have the same appetite for extending statutory protections for employees as the architects of the Fair Work legislation.
Nevertheless, a statutory solution may be the best way forward for Australian employment law. The object of this Act is-(a) to build productive employment relationships through the promotion of good faith in all aspects of the employment environment and of the employment relationship-(i) by recognising that employment relationships must be built not only on the implied mutual obligations of trust and confidence, but also on a legislative requirement for good faith behaviour; . . .
Parties to employment relationship to deal with each other in good faith
(1) The parties to an employment relationship specified in subsection (2) Further sub-sections of s 4 articulate more clearly the practical implications of this duty.
I am going to take the enormous risk of suggesting (without investigating actual New Zealand experience in case law) that promoting good faith as a statutory obligation is sensible, because it avoids the problem of trying to develop a coherent common law in a field heavily regulated by statute. One of the most significant benefits of developing a statutory obligation would be the scope for developing appropriately designed statutory remedies for breach of the obligation. 44 Ideally a statutory scheme would also set up an appropriately qualified specialist court or tribunal to deal with employment disputes.
The problem of remedies
I do suspect that much of the judicial reluctance to develop the common law has been influenced by concern with the nature of common law remedies. Contract law remedies are based on putting a disappointed party into the financial position they would have been in, had the contractual promises been fully performed. This basis for assessing compensation is supported by the underpinning rationale of a system of law designed to support the risk results. In the past, this difficulty was managed by the assumption that an employer could buy out all employment obligations simply by paying the employee for a relatively short period of reasonable notice. That assumption was not seriously challenged until statutory schemes were developed. The statutory schemes prompted the courts in England to develop the implied duty not to destroy trust and confidence, and in Australia, they encouraged employers to accept new obligations to guarantee their employees fair and respectful treatment, generally expressed in their own policies and procedures manuals. Employment law has found itself in a conceptually incoherent mess, because these developments are difficult to reconcile with classical contract law principles.
If statute created these developments because legislators have recognised that employment relationships are not like other commercial contracts, then perhaps it is best that statute take over the field completely, and develop a range of appropriate remedies to deal with breakdowns in employment relationships, to be applied by specialist tribunals empowered for the task.
It may be time to abandon completely the notion that employment is a contractual relationship, amenable to adjudication in the ordinary courts. Creation of a specialist tribunal, able to mediate and arbitrate employment separation disputes for the full range of employed workers (and not just those who fall within the restricted unfair dismissal jurisdiction) may be the best answer to the problem of incoherence in employment law. I feel sure that some of the 
